『大東亜戦争への道』（展転社）
中村 粲
その３５ 第十章 満州事変 第１節 満州緊迫、柳条溝事件へ
幣原外交も田中外交も在支・在満権益の擁護という点では同じでしたが、田中はこれらの権益を擁護するために、支那満洲の治安維持に迄関心を有するに至ったという点で、幣原外交の不干渉主義とは趣を異にしたのでした。しかし、田中の積極政策もあるいは幣原が張学良に対して示した融和政策も、中国の排日政策と反日機運を鎮めるに由無く、事態は満州事変という破局に向かって進むより他なかったのでした。
張学良の易幟の後、赤化された国民党の勢力は公然と東三省に波及し、満州の排日は激成されました。排日と赤化―これが満州事変の基底因になっています。済南事件の最中に南京国民政府の外交部長王正廷はいわゆる「革命外交」を唱道しました。中国側の一方的な通告で、一切の不平等条約を廃棄できるという主張です。昭和３年（１９２８年）７月７日、国民政府は日本に対して明治２９年締結の日清通商航海条約の無効を通告してしてきたのです。この条約は１０年目ごとに改正交渉ができるようになっていますが、中国側の主張は、改正交渉が行われた場合は、交渉が成立しなくても現行法は失効するというもので、このような一方的な執行宣告はとても受け入れられるものではなく、朝野こぞって強硬に反対のでした。昭和４年幣原が外相に復帰し、日支関税協定で中国の関税自主権を承認しました。
しかし、こうしているさなか満洲の深部は赤化され、国民党中央政府の支配の及ばない間島地方の排日暴動となって重大化して行ったのです。満洲の朝鮮人共産主義者は自ら解体して中共に合流し、中共満洲委員会に加盟しました。このような背景の下、昭和５年５月３０日、間島各地で暴動が発生、発電所、通信・交通機関破壊、領事館、親日朝鮮人家屋が襲撃され、間島在住の日本人、朝鮮人に多大の恐怖を巻き起こしました。現地日本人居留民は大会を開き、外務省と出先官憲の軟弱を非難し、警察力増強を要求する陳情書を首相・外相らに送りました。この後、日本人警察官が中国軍隊から一斉射撃を受け、２名即死、１名重傷という事件が起こりましたが、ところが幣原は、日本人警官増強はかえって日支対立を深める恐れがあるとの判断から、応援警察の引き上げを行ったのでした。結果、昭和５年後半には間島の共産主義者によるテロ事件（共匪事件）は、８１件、死者４４、負傷者、焼失家屋無数という結果となったのです。
昭和６年になると「革命外交」路線は一層強められ、特に満州の排日は中央政府の統制が全く不可能なまでに激化して行きました。奉天では遼寧国民外交協会主催の排日会議が開かれ、満洲各地の代表者３００名余りが集まり、満鉄回収を含む日本の在満権益の一掃の問題が討議されました。５月５日から南京で開催された国民会議では、ひたすら日本が非難の対象とされ、「打倒日本帝国主義」が叫ばれ、旅代回収、満鉄回収、鉄道守備兵撤退が怒号されました。理想主義的な外交原則を引っ提げて再び登場した幣原外交でしたが、中国は決して幣原の「善意」に応えようとはしなかったのであり、むしろ「幣原外交の時代となり、支那側は内心安堵し、更に進んで着々革命外交の実施を期待するの至った」（奉天総領事林久治郎著『満州事変と奉天総領事』）。
このような状況を打開すべく引き起こされたのが、昭和６年９月１８日、柳条溝における満鉄爆破に始まる満州事変です。爆破のあと、５００の島本大隊は王位鉄指揮下の独立第７旅団６８００を攻撃して北大営を占拠、翌朝までに奉天市を完全に掌握しました。
危険なガスの充満する満州で、現実に柳条溝の鉄道爆破事件というマッチを擦ったのが日本側であったことは間違いありません。しかし、日本側が点火しなければ必ず中国側によって点火されるほどに満洲の緊迫状況は持ちこたえ得る限界に近づいていたのでした。柳条溝事件は無数の原因の累積の上に加えられた最後の証言員―英語で言う the last straw の如きものでした。ですから、満州事変は原因であるというよりも多くの結果というべきものです。満州事変は日本の中国侵略の出発点ではなく、４半世紀にわたる中国の排日・侮日政策の必然の結果であったというのが作者の結論です。
・その３２，第９章６節： http://hassin.org/01/wp-content/uploads/Road35.pdf
・ 〃 第９章６節 英訳文： https://www.sdh-fact.com/CL/Road35E.pdf
令和７年２月２５日
「史実を世界に発信する会」 会長 茂木弘道
協力者代表：神奈川大学教授 小山和伸
THE ROAD TO THE GREATER EAST ASIAN WAR
Nakamura Akira, Dokkyo University Professor Emeritus
(English Translation: Society for the Dissemination of Historical Fact)
Part 35, Chapter 10: The Manchurian Incident-I
February 25, 2025
The ultimate objectives of Shidehara diplomacy and Tanaka diplomacy were to maintain and develop Japan’s vested interests. The difference between the two lay in the means by which they were to be implemented. Neither Tanaka’s positive policy nor Shidehara’s friendship policy was able to quell Chinese anti-Japanese activities or fully protect Japanese interests in China. With no effective solution in sight, the Japan-China relationship lurched toward the catastrophe that was the Manchurian Incident.
Subsequent to the Northeast Flag Replacement, the influence of the communizing GMD spread to the three eastern provinces, and the anti-Japanese sentiment there intensified steadily. Communization and the anti-Japanese campaign were, without doubt, the underlying causes of the Manchurian Incident. Wang Zhengting, who was installed as the Nanjing government’s ministry of foreign affairs in the throes of the Jinan Incident, cleverly used the democratic movement to promote anti-Japanese policies. The policy that proved most shocking to the Japanese was his “revolutionary diplomacy.”
It was an exceedingly selfish diplomatic ploy by which the Chinese announced, without engaging in any negotiations, that all unequal treaties would be abrogated. On July 7, 1928, the Nationalist government initiated another aspect of revolutionary diplomacy, advising Japan that the Sino-Japanese Treaty of Commerce and Navigation concluded in 1896 was now null and void.
According to the provisions of that treaty, negotiations on its revision could be held every 10 years. However, this time the Chinese stated that the treaty would become invalid should such negotiations take place and fail. With full support from ruling and opposition parties, Japan vehemently protested this unilateral declaration for making light of international practices and principles of good faith. Shidehara, as foreign minister of the Hamaguchi government, recognized Chinese tariff autonomy on May 6, 1930.
However, deep in Manchuria communism was rapidly gaining ground, and violent anti-Japanese incidents were breaking out in the Jiandao region, where the Chinese government had no control. The Korean Communist Party of Manchuria opted to disband and merge with the CCP’s Manchurian Committee. During an uprising that occurred on May 30 in Jiandao, electric power plants, and communications and tariff facilities were destroyed. The Japanese Consulate and the homes of pro-Japanese Koreans were attacked, and Japanese and Koreans living in the area were thrown into panic. Immediately after the incident ended, Japanese residents held a meeting at which they criticized the spineless Foreign Ministry and local authorities. They drafted a petition demanding an increased police presence, which they sent to the prime minister, foreign minister, governor-general of Korea, and Japanese political parties and newspapers. Not long thereafter, Chinese troops fired a volley of shots at Japanese police officers on patrol. Two officers were killed instantly, and another was seriously injured. The Japanese decided to dispatch reinforcements in the form of 103 police officers. However, Shidehara judged that increasing the number of Japanese police would intensify strife between Japan and China, and even threaten Japanese interests in Manchuria. Therefore, over the objection of Saito Makoto, governor general of Korea, he ordered the reinforcements to withdraw, but that decision was met by vociferous protests against Shidehara from Japanese residents of Jiandao. In the latter half of 1930 the number of terrorist incidents in the Jiandao region was estimated at 81, resulting in 44 deaths, and countless injured, not to mention numerous homes destroyed by fire.
By 1931 anti-Japanese sentiment in Manchuria had escalated to the point where the central government could not begin to control them. In April the Liaoning Nationalist Foreign Affairs Association sponsored an anti-Japanese conference in Fengtian, which was attended by 300 representatives from all over Manchuria who discussed the elimination of Japanese interests in Manchuria, including the confiscation of the South Manchurian Railway. When the GMD convention was held in Nanjing from May 5, the mood there was such that Japan became the target of criticism. There was a huge outcry of, “Down with Japanese imperialism!” and angry demands for the recovery of Port Arthur, Dalian, and the Manchurian Railway, as well as withdrawal of Japanese troops guarding railway property. The Chinese did not return the goodwill of the still idealistic Shidehara in kind. Instead, they were relieved by Shidehara’s return and simply barreled ahead, placing their hopes in revolutionary diplomacy.
The Manchurian Incident was set in motion by the Liutiaogou Incident, which took place on September 19, 1931 at Liutiaogou, 8 kilometers north of Fengtian, when explosives were detonated on the tracks of the South Manchurian Railway. After the explosions, the 500-man Shimamoto Battalion attacked a 6,800-man Chinese brigade, routing it completely.
Today everyone in Japan knows that it was the Japanese who struck the match, who instigated the explosion on Manchurian property at Liutiaogou, in a Manchuria whose environment had already turned toxic. If the Japanese had not struck that match, the Chinese would assuredly have done the honors. That is how very explosive and volatile the situation in Manchuria had become. The explosion was merely the final, tiny cause, the last of a mountain of innumerable causes – the last straw, to borrow an English expression that means “a further difficulty that comes after a series of other difficulties, that makes a situation unbearable.” Therefore, the incident was more of an effect than a cause. In other words, the Manchurian Incident cannot be defined as the first stage of Japanese aggression in China. The author’s conclusion is that it was the inevitable result of Chinese policies that were, for a quarter of a century, hostile and insulting to Japan.
URL: https://www.sdh-fact.com/book-article/2286/
PDF: https://www.sdh-fact.com/CL/Road35E.pdf
MOTEKI Hiromichi, Chairman
Society for the Dissemination of Historical Fact