『大東亜戦争への道』（展転社）
中村 粲
その５３ 第十三章 盧溝橋事件の真相 第４節 不拡大への努力
さて、盧溝橋事件の事態に我が国はいかに対応したのでしょうか。
事件発生の翌日の８日、陸軍中央と外務省は直ちに不拡大・現地解決の方針を決めました。９日の閣議で杉山陸将は内地３個師団の派兵を主張しましたが、広田外相をはじめ全閣僚が、全面戦争誘発の危険ありとして反対し、また現地停戦協定成立の報が入ったこともあり、派兵提案は見送られました。
しかし、現地では中国軍が協議事項を守らず、また中央軍北上の報も伝えられたため、政府は１０日、関東軍より２個旅団、朝鮮軍より１個師団、内地３個師団を派兵することを内定、翌１１日「差し当たり内地３個師団」を派兵することを閣議決定し、これを公表しました。
ところが１１日夜８時、現地停戦協定が成立したため、政府は内地師団の動員を見送るとともに、現地軍に不拡大方針を再確認させるために、陸軍の柴山軍務課長と参謀本部の中島総務部長を派遣しました。
今度結ばれた現地停戦協定は、次のような本格的なものでした。
（１） 第２９軍代表は日本軍に遺憾の意を表し、かつ責任者を処分し、将来責任を以て再びかくの如き事件の惹起を防止することを声明す。 （２）略
（３）本事件は、所謂藍衣社、共産党、その他抗日系各種団体の指導に胚胎すること大きに鑑み、将来これが対策を為し、かつ取り締まりを徹底す。
前号でこの第１項についてはご紹介いたしました。２９軍は協定を守ろうとしていたことは、１９日に協定３項が成立し、共産党の策動を弾圧することのほか北平城城内にある第３７師の部隊を他に撤去し、保安隊に治安を維持させることにしたことです。ところが、一方で停戦協定破りは１３日から始まり、次々に行われました。２０日には保安隊と交替して撤退するはずの盧溝橋城の中国軍が突如日本軍に一斉射撃を仕掛けてきたため、日本政府は陸軍中央が前日内定していた内地３個師団派兵を承認しました。しかし、翌２１日、現地に派遣していた柴山軍務課長らが帰国し、目下満鮮からの増派だけで充分であり、また北平城内の３７師が撤退を開始したことが伝えられたために、再度内地３個師団の派兵は見合わせることにしたのでした。
ところが、２５日には郎坊事件、２６日には北平の広安門事件が起こるに及んで、不拡大派の石原莞爾参謀本部作戦部長をして「遷延は一切の破滅だ」との悲痛な言葉を吐かせるに至りました。２７日陸軍中央は三度内地三個師団派兵の動員を下令し、閣議は直ちにこれを承認したのでした。２８日未明、天津軍は２９軍に開戦を通告するに至りました。
・その５３，第１３章４節 日本語原文： https://hassin.org/01/wp-content/uploads/Road53.pdf
・ 〃 第１３章４節 英訳文： https://www.sdh-fact.com/CL/Road53E.pdf
令和８年３月１３日
「史実を世界に発信する会」 会長 茂木弘道
協力者代表：神奈川大学教授 小山和伸
THE ROAD TO THE GREATER EAST ASIAN WAR
Nakamura Akira, Dokkyo University Professor Emeritus
(English Translation: Society for the Dissemination of Historical Fact)
Part 53, Chapter 13: What Transpired at Lugou Bridge – 4
What was Japan’s response to the Lugou Bridge Incident?
On July 8, the day after the incident, central Army authorities and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs decided upon a policy of non-escalation and local resolution. At an extraordinary Cabinet meeting on July 9, Army Minister Sugiyama Hajime pressed for the dispatch of three divisions to China. But Foreign Minister Hirota Koki (and every other Cabinet member, for that matter) opposed his plan on the grounds that doing so might lead to a full-scale war. Also influencing that position was the fact that some Cabinet members had heard that a ceasefire had been negotiated locally. The more intransigent arguments were overruled by a general determination to avoid escalation of the hostilities.
But Chinese troops did not withdraw as promised during the negotiations. Instead, they continued to engage in provocative acts, and rumors began to circulate that the Central Army was advancing northward. On July 10, the Konoe Cabinet made a provisional decision to dispatch two brigades from the Guandong Army, one division from Korea, and three divisions from Japan proper to the Beiping area. On the following day, July 11, the Cabinet decided to dispatch three divisions from Japan as an immediate measure. That decision was made public.
However, when a ceasefire agreement was reached locally at 8:00 p.m. on July 11, the Japanese government postponed the mobilization of divisions from Japan. It also dispatched Shibayama Kenshirō, head of the Army Ministry’s Military Affairs Section, and Nakajima Tetsuzō, head of
the Army General Staff’s General Affairs Bureau, to China to re-emphasize the government’s non-escalation policy.
The local ceasefire agreement on July 11 read as follows:
1. The representatives of the 29th Army hereby express their regret to the Japanese military, and vow that they shall punish those responsible and ensure that incident of this sort do not recur.
2. (Omitted)
3. As this incident was for the most part engineered by the Blue Shirts Society, the Communist Party, and other anti-Japanese groups, exhaustive preventive measures shall be taken in future.
Informed that a supplementary agreement detailing the implementation of Article 3 (concerning the elimination of anti-Japanese activity) had been signed, and that the Hebei-Chahar Political Council would remove 37th Division troops from Beiping, the 29th Army intended to observe the ceasefire agreement. But pro-Communist groups had infiltrated that army, and as early as July 13, acts violating the agreement had commenced. On July 20, Chinese troops at Wanping Fortress, who were scheduled to withdraw and be replaced by security forces, suddenly attacked Japanese troops with a volley of artillery fire. In response to the illegal Chinese attack, the Japanese government approved the deployment of three divisions from Japan. But on July 21, Shibayama Kenshirō, head of the Military Affairs Section, who had been dispatched to the area, returned to Tokyo. There he reported that the Tianjin Garrison could operate effectively with reinforcements from Manchuria and Korea, and that there was no need to mobilize any divisions from Japan. The Tianjin Garrison’s Chief of Staff also stated that the 37th Division in Beiping had begun to withdraw to Baoding. Consequently, Army authorities decided to postpone deploying divisions from Japan.
However, after the outbreak of the Langfang Incident (July 25) and the Guang’an Gate Incident (July 26), Chief of Operations Ishiwara Kanji, the key supporter of non-escalation efforts, felt compelled to announce, “Delay will lead to utter ruin!” On July 27, central Army authorities issued an order to mobilize three divisions from Japan, for the third time. In the early morning of July 28, the Tianjin Garrison notified the 29th Army of its intention to commence hostilities, and proceeded to launch a full-scale assault.
URL: https://www.sdh-fact.com/book-article/2436/
PDF: https://www.sdh-fact.com/CL/Road53E.pdf
Moteki Hiromichi, Chairman
Society for the Dissemination of Historical Fact