『大東亜戦争への道』（展転社）
中村 粲
その１７ 第五章 第一次世界大戦と日本 第１節 「２１カ条」問題を見直す
１９１４（大正３）年７月２８日、第一次世界大戦が勃発しました。イギリスは日英同盟に基づき、「シナ海での英国貿易を攻撃するドイツの仮装巡洋艦を撃破してほしい」との正式参加要請し、英仏露は日本軍を欧州に派遣するよう要請してきました。これは拒絶しましたが、その後ドイツ艦船の活動が盛んになるに及び、１９１７年１月、英国の日本艦艇の地中海派遣の要請についに応諾し日本は第一次世界大戦に参戦することになりました。
大戦中、日華関係を紛糾させたのが「２１カ条要求」問題でした。これは中国の主権を著しく侵害する要求とされていますが、アメリカの史家グリスゥオルドは『アメリカの極東政策』の中で、次のようにその背景を説明しています。
「日露戦争後、日本の富強は大いに増大したが、まだ目標には達せず、朝鮮や満洲の地位も完全とはいいがたかった。…現にノックス（アメリカ）の満洲中立化計画と錦愛鉄道計画は満州における日本の特殊地位を脅かした。中国本土の原料や資源はヨーロッパ諸国にとっては一個の投機の対象でしかなかったが、日本にとっては生きるための鮮血だった。西洋列強にとって支那の政治経済的意義は、日本にとってよりもはるかに少なかった。これらの列強が戦争に没頭している今こそ、日本が事態を整える時だった。三国干渉以来、西洋の干渉主義者たちは、日本が正当且つ死活的に重要な政策を遂行するのを繰り返し妨害してきた。日本は満蒙と山東省の地歩を確固たらしめ、第２の三国干渉の抵抗線としたのだ。…戦後、ヨーロッパの関心が解き放たれた暁、欧州列強の相談で約定がぶち壊されることのないよう、日本は今のうちにシナとの約定を充分拘束力あるものにしておきたかったのだ。簡単に言えば、これが「２１カ条要求」の理由であった。」
「２１カ条要求」は、概略次の通りです。
第１号は、山東省における旧ドイツ権益の処分について事前承諾を求める４か条。
第２号は、旅順・大連租借期限と南満州・安奉両鉄道の期限の９９か年延長、南満州・東部内蒙古での日本人の土地所有権や居住往来営業権、または鉄道建設や顧問勝兵塾における日本の優先権を要求する７か条。
第３号は、漢冶薸公司を適当な機会に日支合弁とすることなどを求める２箇条。
第４号は、支那の沿岸の港湾や島嶼を他国に割譲せぬことを求める１箇条。
第５号が、支那の主権を侵害するとされた７か条の希望（要求ではない）事項で、日本人を政治・軍事顧問として招聘すること（第１条）日本の病院・寺院・学校に土地所有権を認めること（第２条）、必要の地方で警察を日支合同とすること（第３条）、日本に一定数量の兵器の供給を求めるか支那に日支合弁の兵器廠を設立すること（第４条）、南支で鉄道敷設権を日本に与えること（第５条）、福建省の鉄道敷設権を日本に与えること（第６条）、支那での日本人の布教権を認めること。（第７条）
実際は、１４ヵ条の要求と７か条の希望条項でした。
１４条の要求は、グリスゥオルドの言うとおり、これまでの約定を列国並みにし、充分拘束力のあるものにしようというもので、特に非難さるべきものではありません。
７か条の希望条項についていえば、孫文は１９１５年３月、外務省政務局長・小池張造に書簡を送り、その中で「日中盟約案」として（１）日中共同作戦を便ならしめるため、兵器はすべて日本と同式にする。（２）中国の軍と政府は外国人を聘用するときは日本人を優先させる、（３）鉱山・鉄道・沿岸航路経営のため外国資本を要したり合弁を行う場合はまず日本と協議する―等を提案しております。７か条を主権侵害と非難する人は、孫文を否定、非難していることになります。
・その１６，第４章２節 日本語原文： http://hassin.org/01/wp-content/uploads/Road17.pdf
・ 〃 第４章２節 英訳文： https://www.sdh-fact.com/CL/Road17E.pdf
令和５年８月１８日
「史実を世界に発信する会」 会長 茂木弘道
協力者代表：神奈川大学教授 小山和伸
＊拡散大歓迎
THE ROAD TO THE GREATER EAST ASIAN WAR
Nakamura Akira, Dokkyo University Professor Emeritus
(English Translation: Society for the Dissemination of Historical Fact)
Part 17, Chapter 5: Japan and World War I-1
On July 28, 1914, World War I broke out. Britain formally asked the Japanese government “to employ some of their warships in hunting and destroying German armed merchantmen in China.” On August 15 Japan sent an ultimatum to Germany. Japan turned down requests from Britain, France, and Russia to deploy Japanese troops to Europe. The activity of German warships intensified, and in January 1917 Britain again asked Japan to send warships to the Mediterranean Sea. Japan acquiesced, and in early February dispatched a torpedo squadron comprising a cruiser and eight destroyers.
During World War I, Sino-Japanese relations were complicated by what are referred to as the Twenty-One Demands, which are considered by some to be a synonym for aggression against China. However, American historian Alfred W. Griswold offers his opinion in Far Eastern Policy of the United States, as follows:
Japan had been making great strides toward wealth and power since her war with Russia. But she had by no means reached the objectives the attainment of which she believed her geographical situation made imperative. The position in Korea, southern Manchuria and eastern Inner Mongolia that she had wrested from Russia and fortified with the sundry political instruments already discussed had enhanced her sense of security, yet left it far from complete. … The Knox neutralization scheme and the Chinchow-Aigun project had threatened the foundation of her special position north of the Great Wall. … In China proper lay the raw materials and natural resources which, for Europe, were profitable speculations, but for Japan were the lifeblood of existence. … Now that these Western nations were preoccupied with the war, Japan would adjust the situation. Since 1895, when France, Russia and Germany had forced her to return the Liaotung Peninsula to China, Western interventionists had repeatedly thwarted Japan in her pursuit of what, to her, was not only a just but vitally essential policy. … She would strengthen her foothold in Manchuria and Mongolia, and make that in Shantung secure enough to withstand another Triple Intervention. … Finally, she would make the contract so binding that it could not be broken on European council tables once the war freed Europe’s attention. Such, briefly, was the origin of the Twenty-One Demands.
A summary of the Twenty-One Demands follows.
Group 1: Four articles whereby the Japanese government demands that the Chinese government agree in advance to Japan’s disposition of former German interests in Shandong province.
Group II: Seven articles demanding: a 99-year extension of the leases on Port Arthur and Dalian, as well as on the South Manchurian and Anfeng railways: permission for Japanese nationals to reside, travel, and conduct business in South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia; consent of the Japanese government when a railway is to be built or the Chinese government employs advisors, to be obtained in advance.
Group III: Two articles demanding that the Hanyeping Co. be made a joint Japanese-Chinese concern when the opportune moment arrives.
Group IV: One article demanding that the Chinese government neither cede nor lease any harbor, bay, or island along the coast of China to a third power.
Group V: Seven articles (these were desiderata, not demands) that were alleged to infringe upon Chinese sovereignty:(Article 1) a request that Chinese government employ Japanese political and military advisors; (Article 2) a request that Japanese hospitals, temples, and schools be given the right to own land; (Article 3) a request that joint Japanese-Chinese police forces be established in certain areas, if necessary; (Article 4) a request that China purchase a fixed amount of weapons from Japan or establish a Japanese-Chinese jointly operated arsenal; (Article 5) a request that railway construction rights in South China be granted to Japan; (Article 6) a request that priority be given to Japan concerning the construction or working of railways, mines, and harbors in Fujian province; (Article 7) a request that Japanese subjects be granted the right to do missionary work in China.
Thus, there were 14 demands and seven requests. The 14 demands were not unreasonable, given the situation at the time.
Then, what about the seven requests? Dr. Sun Yat-sen, Chinese revolutionary leader, sent a note to Koike Chōzō, head of the Foreign Ministry’s Political Affairs Bureau in mid-March 1915. In it Sun proposed a Japan-China covenant that would include the following terms: (1) to facilitate joint Japan-China operations, Chinese weapons would be manufactured to match the gauge of Japanese weapons, (2) when Chinese military or government planned to employ foreigners, Japanese would be given priority, and (3) Japan would be consulted in advance when foreign capital was needed or a merger was planned for mines, railways, or coastal routes.
This means that Sun Yat-sen was in agreement with both Japan’s demands and desiderata.
URL: https://www.sdh-fact.com/book-article/2106/
PDF: https://www.sdh-fact.com/CL/Road17E.pdf