『大東亜戦争への道』（展転社）
中村 粲
その３１ 第九章 赤色支那への対応 第３節 田中外交の北伐対応
田中義一内閣は昭和２（１９２７）年４月２０日に発足しました。外相は首相が兼任しました。４月２２日、田中首相は施政方針を内外に声明しましたが、それは支那に対する同情と援助の用意があること、ただし支那国民の要望実現には順序と方法を考慮すべきこと、特に支那共産党の動向について日本は無関心でありえぬこと、そして必要ならば列強と協調すべきことを述べ、世界平和のために尽力せんと結んでいました。共産主義への関心の表明を除いては、幣原外交の基本理念とさほど違ったものではありませんでした。
さて、蒋介石軍の北上に対して北軍の形勢日に悪化するにつれ、済南２千２百、天津６千７百、北京千５百、青島１万３千の在留邦人保護のための出兵が避けられなくなりました。６月１日、旅順の第１０師団の第３３旅団２千を青島に上陸させました。第一次山東出兵です。ところが、蒋介石軍が北軍に大敗し、最早駐兵の必要がなくなり、９月上旬には日本軍は撤兵しました。
６月２７日から７月７まで、田中は根本的な対支政策を確立すべく、現地官憲代表者を招集して一大連絡会議を開催しました。いわゆる東方会議です。会議の最終日に発表された「対支政策要綱」の骨子は次のようなものです。
（１） 支那の内乱については一党一派に変せず、民意を尊重する。
（２） 支那の穏健分子の正当な国民的要望に対しては満腔の同情を以て協力する。
（３） 支那の各政権に対する日本政府の態度は全く同様で、共同政府の成立を歓迎し、助成する。
（４） 支那における我が国の権益並びに在留邦人の生命財産が不法に侵害される恐れがある場合は、必要に応じ断固として自衛措置をとる。
（５） 満蒙殊に東三省（満州）は国防及び国民的生存の上から重大な利害があるため、我国としては特殊の考慮を要し、又同地方を内外人安住の地たらしめることは隣邦としての責務である。門戸開放・機会均等主義により満蒙での内外人の経済活動を促進させる。
（６） 東三省の有力者で、満蒙における我が特殊地位を尊重し、まじめに満蒙の政情安定の方途を講ずるものは、これを支持する。
（７） 万一、動乱満蒙に波及し、我国の特殊権益が侵害される恐れある場合は、これを防護し、内外人安住発展の地として保持されるよう、機を逸せず適当の措置に出るの覚悟あるを要す。
第５項については、日本は満蒙に対して排他的地位を主張するのではなく、米英仏は勿論、ロシア人に対しても開放して差し支えなしと言い切っています。
この東方会議の結論を見ると、支那本土に関しては幣原の方針をそのまま踏襲したものと言えます。しかし、後段に、共産分子による我が在支権益や居留民の生命財産の侵害には断固自衛措置を取ることが表明されている点は、幣原の消極無為の政策とは異なるもので、「田中積極外交」なる名称もこれに依るわけでしょう。
会議終了後、会議に出席した芳沢公使は北京に帰任する前に南京に立ち寄りました。外交部や総司令部に大歓迎されました。胡漢民は歓迎の辞の中で、東方会議の精神は国民政府に対し同情を示すものであったことを喜ぶと述べております。東方会議の精神が中国にとっても歓迎すべきものであったことを示しています。
しかし、一部の教科書が「田中内閣は、山東省の在留日本人の保護を名目に山東出兵を行い、北伐への武力干渉をくわだてるとともに、東方会議を開いて強硬外交の方針を決定した」などと書いているのは、歴史事実に反する虚論というべきでしょう。
・その３１，第９章３節： https://hassin.org/01/wp-content/uploads/Road31.pdf
・ 〃 第９章２節 英訳文： https://www.sdh-fact.com/CL/Road31E.pdf
令和６年１０月１１日
「史実を世界に発信する会」 会長 茂木弘道
協力者代表：神奈川大学教授 小山和伸
＊拡散大歓迎
THE ROAD TO THE GREATER EAST ASIAN WAR
Nakamura Akira, Dokkyo University Professor Emeritus
(English Translation: Society for the Dissemination of Historical Fact)
Part 31, Chapter 9: Contending with Attempts to Communize China-III
Prime Minister Tanaka Giichi’s cabinet took office on April 20, 1927. Tanaka, serving concurrently as foreign minister, announced his administration’s policy guidelines on April 22. According to those guidelines, the Japanese government was prepared to offer empathy and support to China, but needed to give due consideration to the procedures and methods used to satisfy the requirements of the Chinese people. They state that Japan was fully committed to the achievement of world peace, at the same time emphasizing the importance of Japan’s keeping abreast of developments in the CCP, and cooperating with other nations if necessary. Aside from the reference to communism, Tanaka’s guidelines were not radically different from the philosophy underpinning Shidehara diplomacy.
As the NRA advanced northward, the irresistible force of Chiang’s army put a damper on the prospects of the northern armies. The Shandong army was defeated along the Tianjin-Pukou Railway, the Fengtian army suffered an even worse defeat along the Beijing-Hankou Railway, and a crisis was imminent in Jinan and locations in the Beijing-Tianjin area, where approximately 24,000 Japanese civilians resided. The prime minister decided to dispatch troops to protect Japanese civilians. Two thousand members of the 33rd Infantry Brigade, under the 10th Division based in Port Arthur, landed in Qingdao on June 1. However, Chiang’s army suffered serious defeats later and the Northern Expedition was suspended. In early September the Japanese government decided that there was no longer a need to station troops in Shandong, and as it had previously promised, withdrew its troops.
Prime Minister Tanaka decided to summon Japanese officials assigned to China to Tokyo for a major liaison conference. Those men would work together with central government officials to formulate a
China policy. The gathering became known as the Eastern Conference. On July 7, the last day of the conference, Tanaka produced his Overview of China Policy, which was distributed in Japan and abroad. Its essential points follow.
(1) As far as the domestic conflict in China is concerned, we shall respect the will of the Chinese people, rather than favoring any one party or faction.
(2) We shall cooperate wholeheartedly with legitimate national demands from moderate elements in China.
(3) The position of the Japanese government regarding each of the Chinese government shall be exactly the same; in the event that there is progress toward the establishment of a common government, we shall welcome and support that progress.
(4) In the event that Japan’s rights and interests in China, and the lives and property of Japanese residents of China are unlawfully compromised, we reserve the right to take robust defensive action.
(5) Manchuria and Mongolia, especially the three eastern provinces (Manchuria), are of great importance to Japan from the standpoint of our national defense and survival. We believe that those regions require special consideration from Japan, and it is our responsibility as a neighboring nation to ensure that both nationals and foreigners can live peacefully in those regions. We shall promote economic activity of both nationals and foreigners in Manchuria and Mongolia in accordance with the principles of the Open Door Policy and equal opportunity.
(6) We shall support influential individuals in the three eastern provinces who respect our special status in Manchuria and Mongolia, and who make sincere efforts to stabilize the political situation there.
(7) In the unlikely event that unrest spreads to Manchuria and Mongol, and Japan’s special rights and interests in the region are likely to be compromised, we must be prepared to take appropriate steps immediately to protect said special rights and interests, and ensure that the affected regions remain places where nationals and foreigners can live and prosper in peace.
In connection with (5), Vice-minister Mori stated that Japan would not adopt a closed policy in Manchuria and Mongolia, but rather “shall welcome foreigners, including citizens of the UK, the US, France, and even Russia to invest there in the spirit of the Open Door Policy and equal opportunity.”
The conclusions reached by the Eastern Conference, as far as China proper was concerned, were in keeping with policies favored by Shidehara. But the latter part of the Overview of China Policy states that resolute defense measures would be taken against transgressions by communist elements against Japanese interests in China. This portion differed from Shidehara’s passive, ineffective policies, and probably gave rise to the term “assertive Tanaka diplomacy.”
After the Eastern Conference ended, Yoshizawa Kenkichi, minister to China, stopped in Nanjing prior to returning to his base in Beijing. He received a warm welcome from the Foreign Affairs Department and General Headquarters. In a speech Hu Hanmin, head of the GMD Legislative Yuan, said that he welcomed the China policy adopted by the Eastern Conference.
URL: https://www.sdh-fact.com/book-article/2244/
PDF: https://www.sdh-fact.com/CL/Road31E.pdf
MOTEKI Hiromichi, Chairman
Society for the Dissemination of Historical Fact