『大東亜戦争への道』（展転社）
中村 粲
その４２ 第十一章 北支をめぐる日華関係 第１節 塘沽停戦協定
満州国が建国されたのは昭和７（１９３２）年３月でした。しかしその後も２０万を超える兵匪が跋扈していたため、関東軍の討伐作戦が行われ、その結果、昭和８（１９３３）年２月ころまでには、匪賊は大体掃討されたのでした。
しかし熱河省には、満州を追われた張学良が４万の義勇軍を編成して侵入し、反満抗日の策源地たらしめていました。そこで関東軍は、２月初旬、満州国騒乱の元凶である張学良の勢力を一掃するために
熱河作戦を開始し、瞬く間に省内の敵を潰走せしめ、３月上旬には万里長城の主要関門を確保しました。ただし、武藤信義関東軍司令官は次のような内訓を発して、長城を超える作戦を厳禁しました。
「熱河計略は純然たる満洲国内問題にして、対支戦争を惹起するは国策としてこれを取らざる所なり。…長城を隔つる河北省は中華民国の領域にして、大命あるにあらざれば、軍として作戦行動許されざる地域たるをわきまえ、・・・遺憾なきを期すべし。」
国民政府は中央軍５万を北上させたため、関東軍は長城の各関門付近で猛烈な反撃にあって苦戦しました。苦戦の原因は一つには長城壁に拠る中国軍から見下ろされる位置にあるためでした。中国軍は、我が軍が長城の主要関門を占領しても長城線を越えないのに乗じて約２０個師団の中央軍を平津地方に集中し、熱河省に侵入してくるに至りました。４月中旬日本軍は冷口と喜峰口で長城線を突破し中国軍を追撃しました。このように相手の攻撃に対抗するためにやむなく長城線を突破した攻撃を行うに至ったのでした。そして破竹の日本軍の逆襲が始まりました。５月２３日、北京を指呼の間にせまりますと、中国側は停戦を求めてきまして、５月３１日、塘沽において停戦協定が結ばれ、中国軍は延慶・通州・芦台の線以南に撤退し、そこから長城線の間は中国側警察が治安の維持を行うが、非武将地帯とすることになったのです。
これにより、純軍事的には満洲国境の事実上の承認が得られたのですが、石原莞爾はこれを次のように批判しています。
「塘沽協定で日支紛争を局地解決したことは一応の成功であったが、更に外交交渉を進めて蒋介石に排日停止、共同防共、満州国承認、少なくとも黙認迄させるべきであった。満州事変の終末指導をいい加減にしたことが、将来支那事変にまで進展させた一つの素因であった。」
なお、東京裁判に於いて、パル判事は、満州事変は昭和８年の５月の塘沽停戦協定で終結しており、その後、日支関係は改善され、また満洲国も国家として承認されるに至ったことなどを挙げ、満州事変は降伏調印よりもはるか以前に集結した戦争であるから、東京裁判の管轄権の範囲外に属すると論じました。
・その４２，第１１章１節 日本語原文： https://hassin.org/01/wp-content/uploads/Road42.pdf
・ 〃 第１１章１節 英訳文： https://www.sdh-fact.com/CL/Road42E.pdf
令和７年９月５日
「史実を世界に発信する会」 会長 茂木弘道
協力者代表：神奈川大学教授 小山和伸
THE ROAD TO THE GREATER EAST ASIAN WAR
Nakamura Akira, Dokkyo University Professor Emeritus
(English Translation: Society for the Dissemination of Historical Fact)
Part 42, Chapter 11: Japan-China Relations on Northen China -1
Manzhouguo was established in March 1932. But in the ensuing years, bandits continued to run rampant in the region – more than 200,000 of them. The Japanese Guandong Army launched punitive expeditions against them, and as a result, by February 1933 most of the bandits had been expelled or eliminated.
Meanwhile Zhang Xueliang, who had been driven out of Manchuria, managed to form a volunteer army of 40,000 men strong. He proceeded to invade Rehe province, where he organized a base of operations for anti-Manzhouguo and anti-Japanese activity. In the beginning of February 1933, Guandong Army launched Operation Rehe, whose objective was to expel Zhang’s forces, which were the main cause of the turmoil in Manzhouguo. The Japanese speedily routed the Chinese, and, by early March, had taken control of the Great Wall’s key passes. But Commander Mutō Nobuyoshi issued the following secret directive on February 19, which strictly forbade his men from venturing south of the Great Wall.
The operation at hand concerns Manzhouguo and only Manzhouguo. Provoking war with China is contrary to national policy. … Hebei province, situated beyond the Great Wall, is Republic of China territory. We may not take operational action in Hebei in the absence of imperial orders.
However, the Nationalist government ordered the 50,000-man Central Army to advance northward. The Guangdong Army was struggling in the face of fierce Chinese Central Army counteroffensives at every major pass along the Great Wall, in part because the Chinese had the advantage of being able to look down the Japanese from the Great Wall. China’s 20-division Central Army, realizing that the Japanese should stop short of the Great Wall, assembled in the Pingjin area and made repeated attempts to recapture the positions they had lost. The Japanese were provoked into expanding their theater to include the interior of the passes. Now the Japanese offensive beyond the Great Wall began in earnest. By May 23, Beiping was within striking distance. At this juncture the Chinese were helpless. On May 25 the Chinese dispatched an emissary with a formal ceasefire proposal. On May 31 the Tanggu Truce was signed. Its essential points were (1) the Chinese army shall immediately withdraw to regions west and south of the line from Yanqing to … Tongzhou … and Lutai; (2) the Japanese army will not cross the said line, nor continue to attack Chinese troops, and shall voluntarily withdraw to the Great Wall; and (3) in the region to the south of the Great Wall and north and east of the line defined in (1), maintenance of peace and order shall be undertaken by the Chinese police force.
The Tanggu Truce clearly delineated the border between Manchuria and China and provided, to some extent, a resolution of the Manchurian Incident. Why, then, did it not put a complete end to disputes between Japan and China?
General Ishihara Kanji replied to this sensitive question: “The Tanggu Truce was a success in that it offered a local resolution to the conflict between Japan and China. However, it should have gone further, including provisions for diplomatic negotiations resulting in a promise (even a tacit one) from Chiang Kai-shek to put a halt to anti-Japanese activity, initiate Japan-China joint efforts to combat communism, and recognize Manzhouguo.
URL: https://www.sdh-fact.com/book-article/2356
PDF: https://www.sdh-fact.com/CL/Road42E.pdf
Moteki Hiromichi, Chairman
Society for the Dissemination of Historical Fact