SDHF Newsletter No.440J 大東亜戦争への道 その44 第11章 北支をめぐる日華関係ー3

『大東亜戦争への道』(展転社)
中村 粲
その44 第十一章 北支をめぐる日華関係 第3節 梅津・何応欽協定

華北における日・満・支関係は、塘沽停戦協定協定の成立を転機に逐次平静に向かうが如くでしたが、内情は必ずしもそうではなく、中国側は表に親日を装いつつ裏に反日、反満策動を行う状況でした。これら反日満運動の中心は河北省主席于学忠(旧東北系)、国民党部関係者、中央直系軍、藍衣社(テロを主務とする国民党秘密と組む工作機関)等で、彼らは北支が停戦協定以来、比較的静穏で関東軍や天津軍の注意を引くことの少ないのに乗じて潜行的に活動してきたのですが、昭和10年に至って反日満行動に出たのです。国民政府の排日取り締まりにしても、ある程度は効果をあげましたが、政府の威令は十分ではなく、殊に北支ではそうでした。昭和10年1月から5月までに北支で発生した反日満事件は大小五十数件にも上りました。その代表的事例が親日新聞社長暗殺事件です。
天津の中国新聞「国権報」と「振報」は従来から親日満の立場でしたが、5月2日から3日にかけて両新聞社長が共にピストルで暗殺されたのです。調査の結果北平軍事委員会、藍衣社、国民党などが関与し、犯行指揮者は藍衣社の楊虎であり、国民党によって上海に匿われていることも判明しました。
日本側は、1)蒋介石の二重政策の放棄、2)実行機関たる憲兵第3団、国民党部、藍衣社の北支撤退、3)河北省主席・于学忠の罷免等を要求しました。何応欽は梅津駐屯軍司令官宛てに文書で受け入れを表明して事件は落着し、排日機関と中央軍は河北省から撤退しました。(梅津・何応欽協定)
中央軍29軍の軍長宋哲元は、塘沽停戦協定の後、次第に反満抗日的態度に出て、昭和9年後半から10年にかけて相次いで日本側との間に問題を惹起しました。関東軍はこれに対して宋哲元軍の黄河以南撤退を要求する方針を示しましたが、陸軍中央は、「この際、強硬態度に出ことはかんがえものと思料す。又交渉はなるべく校正なる態度によるを可とす」と打電し、関東軍も中央の穏健方針に歩み寄りました。一方中国側も自発的に宋哲元軍のチャハル省主席と第29軍長の職を免じ、民生庁長・秦徳純を首席代理とするなどの措置を取りました。奉天特務機関長土肥原少将は、秦徳純との間でチャハル省内の排日機関撤去、宋哲元軍のチャハル省からの撤退の文書を交わしました。(土肥原・秦徳純協定)これによって、宋哲元の第29軍はチャハル省から北平方面に移駐したのでした。
ところがこの29軍にはすでに中共党員など多くの抗日分子が潜入していまして、この2年後にはついに盧溝橋事件を引き起こすに至るのでした。

・その43,第11章3節 日本語原文: https://hassin.org/01/wp-content/uploads/Road44.pdf
・ 〃   第11章3節 英訳文:https://www.sdh-fact.com/CL/Road44E.pdf

令和7年9月16日
「史実を世界に発信する会」 会長 茂木弘道
協力者代表:神奈川大学教授 小山和伸

THE ROAD TO THE GREATER EAST ASIAN WAR
Nakamura Akira, Dokkyo University Professor Emeritus
(English Translation: Society for the Dissemination of Historical Fact)
Part 44, Chapter 11: Japan-China Relations on Northen China -3

It seemed that in North China, relations among Japan, Manzhouguo, and China were becoming less fraught after the Tanggu Truce was signed. Unfortunately, the reality was quite different. Though the Chinese were feigning friendliness toward the Japanese, they were secretly engaging in terrorist activity targeting the Japanese and Manzhouguo. At the center of anti-Japanese, anti-Manzhouguo movement were Hebei Governor Yu Xuezhong (a former northeastern warlord), GMD Central Headquarters personnel, the Central Army, and the Blue Shirt Society (the GMD’s secret special operation agency whose chief function was terrorism.) These individuals and organizations had gone underground, capitalizing on the fact that North China had been relatively quiet since the cease fire agreement. Therefore, they largely escaped the notice of the Guandong Army and the Tianjin Garrison. But in 1935, their activity became more blatant.

Japanese Army records show that between January and May of 1935, there were more than 50 instances of major and minor anti-Japanese and anti-Manzhouguo offenses. The most notable cases were the assassinations of Chinese company presidents who were sympathetic to Japan. There were two Chinese language newspapers in Tianjin that had historically been pro-Japanese: National Rights, and the Tientsin Morning Post. Between May 2 and 3, the presidents of both newspaper companies were murdered by assassins armed with pistols. It was revealed that the Beiping branch of the Military Affairs Commission, the Blue Shits Society, and GMD had been involved in the assassination. Yang Hu, head of the Shanghai Defense Commission and the Blue Shirt Society’s Central Executive Committee, orchestrated the plot and then went into hiding in the French Concession in Shanghai.

The Japanese representatives presented the following demands:

(1) Chiang Kai-shek must abandon his hypocritical policy.
(2) Organizations committing acts of terrorism must withdraw from North China.
(3) The 3rd and 25th divisions, which provide support for (2) must withdraw from North China.
(4) Hu Xuezhong, governor of Hebei province must be dismissed.

After a considerable delay, the Nationalists telegraphed the following notification to He Yingqin, head of the Beiping Branch of the Military Affairs Commission:

(1) Nationalist Party bureaus shall withdraw from Hebei province.
(2) Central Army units shall withdraw from Hebei province.
(3) Order prohibiting anti-Japanese activity through China shall be issued.

The above notification became the Umezu-He Agreement. The incident thereby resolved, Chinese anti-Japanese organizations and Central Army units withdrew from Hebei province.
Song Zheyuan, commander of the 29th Army, became increasingly anti-Japanese after the Tanggu Truce was signed. From the last half of 1934 through 1935, Song created problem after problem for the Japanese. The Guandong Army requested the withdrawal of Song’s forces south of the Yellow River. However, central Army authorities disagreed with Guandong Army’s hardline position. On their part, the Chinese, of their own accord, relieved Song Zheyuan of his position as governor of Chahar province and commander of the 29th Army. They also appointed Qin Dechun, then commissioner of civil affairs, as acting provincial governor. The Guandong Army also softened its requirements for resolution, for instance, by cancelling its demand for withdrawal of Song’s army south of the Yellow River. Maj.-Gen. Doihara presented the revised Japanese demands to Song. On June 27, Qin Dechun responded in writing that the Chinese would accept all of Japan’s demands, including removing anti-Japanese organizations and Song’s army from Chahar province. The missive served as the basis for the Doihara-Qin Agreement.

As a result, Song’s 29th army moved out of Chahar, regrouping in the Beiping area. But who could have known that the 29th Army had already been infiltrated by a great many anti-Japanese elements, most of them CCP members, and that two years later it would cause the Lugou Bridge Incident?

URL: https://www.sdh-fact.com/book-article/2369
PDF: https://www.sdh-fact.com/CL/Road44E.pdf

Moteki Hiromichi, Chairman
Society for the Dissemination of Historical Fact

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