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『大東亜戦争への道』（展転社）
中村　粲

その３５　第十章　満州事変　第１節　満州緊迫、柳条溝事件へ

幣原外交も田中外交も在支・在満権益の擁護という点では同じでしたが、田中はこれらの権益を擁護するために、支那満洲の治安維持に迄関心を有するに至ったという点で、幣原外交の不干渉主義とは趣を異にしたのでした。しかし、田中の積極政策もあるいは幣原が張学良に対して示した融和政策も、中国の排日政策と反日機運を鎮めるに由無く、事態は満州事変という破局に向かって進むより他なかったのでした。

張学良の易幟の後、赤化された国民党の勢力は公然と東三省に波及し、満州の排日は激成されました。排日と赤化―これが満州事変の基底因になっています。済南事件の最中に南京国民政府の外交部長王正廷はいわゆる「革命外交」を唱道しました。中国側の一方的な通告で、一切の不平等条約を廃棄できるという主張です。昭和３年（１９２８年）７月７日、国民政府は日本に対して明治２９年締結の日清通商航海条約の無効を通告してしてきたのです。この条約は１０年目ごとに改正交渉ができるようになっていますが、中国側の主張は、改正交渉が行われた場合は、交渉が成立しなくても現行法は失効するというもので、このような一方的な執行宣告はとても受け入れられるものではなく、朝野こぞって強硬に反対のでした。昭和４年幣原が外相に復帰し、日支関税協定で中国の関税自主権を承認しました。

しかし、こうしているさなか満洲の深部は赤化され、国民党中央政府の支配の及ばない間島地方の排日暴動となって重大化して行ったのです。満洲の朝鮮人共産主義者は自ら解体して中共に合流し、中共満洲委員会に加盟しました。このような背景の下、昭和５年５月３０日、間島各地で暴動が発生、発電所、通信・交通機関破壊、領事館、親日朝鮮人家屋が襲撃され、間島在住の日本人、朝鮮人に多大の恐怖を巻き起こしました。現地日本人居留民は大会を開き、外務省と出先官憲の軟弱を非難し、警察力増強を要求する陳情書を首相・外相らに送りました。この後、日本人警察官が中国軍隊から一斉射撃を受け、２名即死、１名重傷という事件が起こりましたが、ところが幣原は、日本人警官増強はかえって日支対立を深める恐れがあるとの判断から、応援警察の引き上げを行ったのでした。結果、昭和５年後半には間島の共産主義者によるテロ事件（共匪事件）は、８１件、死者４４、負傷者、焼失家屋無数という結果となったのです。

昭和６年になると「革命外交」路線は一層強められ、特に満州の排日は中央政府の統制が全く不可能なまでに激化して行きました。奉天では遼寧国民外交協会主催の排日会議が開かれ、満洲各地の代表者３００名余りが集まり、満鉄回収を含む日本の在満権益の一掃の問題が討議されました。５月５日から南京で開催された国民会議では、ひたすら日本が非難の対象とされ、「打倒日本帝国主義」が叫ばれ、旅代回収、満鉄回収、鉄道守備兵撤退が怒号されました。理想主義的な外交原則を引っ提げて再び登場した幣原外交でしたが、中国は決して幣原の「善意」に応えようとはしなかったのであり、むしろ「幣原外交の時代となり、支那側は内心安堵し、更に進んで着々革命外交の実施を期待するの至った」（奉天総領事林久治郎著『満州事変と奉天総領事』）。

このような状況を打開すべく引き起こされたのが、昭和６年９月１８日、柳条溝における満鉄爆破に始まる満州事変です。爆破のあと、５００の島本大隊は王位鉄指揮下の独立第７旅団６８００を攻撃して北大営を占拠、翌朝までに奉天市を完全に掌握しました。

危険なガスの充満する満州で、現実に柳条溝の鉄道爆破事件というマッチを擦ったのが日本側であったことは間違いありません。しかし、日本側が点火しなければ必ず中国側によって点火されるほどに満洲の緊迫状況は持ちこたえ得る限界に近づいていたのでした。柳条溝事件は無数の原因の累積の上に加えられた最後の証言員―英語で言う the last straw の如きものでした。ですから、満州事変は原因であるというよりも多くの結果というべきものです。満州事変は日本の中国侵略の出発点ではなく、４半世紀にわたる中国の排日・侮日政策の必然の結果であったというのが作者の結論です。

・その３２，第９章６節： http://hassin.org/01/wp-content/uploads/Road35.pdf
・　〃　　第９章６節　英訳文： https://www.sdh-fact.com/CL/Road35E.pdf

令和７年２月２５日

「史実を世界に発信する会」 会長　茂木弘道
協力者代表：神奈川大学教授　小山和伸

THE ROAD TO THE GREATER EAST ASIAN WAR
Nakamura Akira, Dokkyo University Professor Emeritus
(English Translation: Society for the Dissemination of Historical Fact)
Part 35, Chapter 10: The Manchurian Incident-I

February 25, 2025

The ultimate objectives of Shidehara diplomacy and Tanaka diplomacy were to maintain and develop Japan’s vested interests. The difference between the two lay in the means by which they were to be implemented. Neither Tanaka’s positive policy nor Shidehara’s friendship policy was able to quell Chinese anti-Japanese activities or fully protect Japanese interests in China. With no effective solution in sight, the Japan-China relationship lurched toward the catastrophe that was the Manchurian Incident.

Subsequent to the Northeast Flag Replacement, the influence of the communizing GMD spread to the three eastern provinces, and the anti-Japanese sentiment there intensified steadily. Communization and the anti-Japanese campaign were, without doubt, the underlying causes of the Manchurian Incident. Wang Zhengting, who was installed as the Nanjing government’s ministry of foreign affairs in the throes of the Jinan Incident, cleverly used the democratic movement to promote anti-Japanese policies. The policy that proved most shocking to the Japanese was his “revolutionary diplomacy.”

It was an exceedingly selfish diplomatic ploy by which the Chinese announced, without engaging in any negotiations, that all unequal treaties would be abrogated. On July 7, 1928, the Nationalist government initiated another aspect of revolutionary diplomacy, advising Japan that the Sino-Japanese Treaty of Commerce and Navigation concluded in 1896 was now null and void.

According to the provisions of that treaty, negotiations on its revision could be held every 10 years. However, this time the Chinese stated that the treaty would become invalid should such negotiations take place and fail. With full support from ruling and opposition parties, Japan vehemently protested this unilateral declaration for making light of international practices and principles of good faith. Shidehara, as foreign minister of the Hamaguchi government, recognized Chinese tariff autonomy on May 6, 1930.

However, deep in Manchuria communism was rapidly gaining ground, and violent anti-Japanese incidents were breaking out in the Jiandao region, where the Chinese government had no control. The Korean Communist Party of Manchuria opted to disband and merge with the CCP’s Manchurian Committee. During an uprising that occurred on May 30 in Jiandao, electric power plants, and communications and tariff facilities were destroyed. The Japanese Consulate and the homes of pro-Japanese Koreans were attacked, and Japanese and Koreans living in the area were thrown into panic. Immediately after the incident ended, Japanese residents held a meeting at which they criticized the spineless Foreign Ministry and local authorities. They drafted a petition demanding an increased police presence, which they sent to the prime minister, foreign minister, governor-general of Korea, and Japanese political parties and newspapers. Not long thereafter, Chinese troops fired a volley of shots at Japanese police officers on patrol. Two officers were killed instantly, and another was seriously injured. The Japanese decided to dispatch reinforcements in the form of 103 police officers. However, Shidehara judged that increasing the number of Japanese police would intensify strife between Japan and China, and even threaten Japanese interests in Manchuria. Therefore, over the objection of Saito Makoto, governor general of Korea, he ordered the reinforcements to withdraw, but that decision was met by vociferous protests against Shidehara from Japanese residents of Jiandao. In the latter half of 1930 the number of terrorist incidents in the Jiandao region was estimated at 81, resulting in 44 deaths, and countless injured, not to mention numerous homes destroyed by fire.

By 1931 anti-Japanese sentiment in Manchuria had escalated to the point where the central government could not begin to control them. In April the Liaoning Nationalist Foreign Affairs Association sponsored an anti-Japanese conference in Fengtian, which was attended by 300 representatives from all over Manchuria who discussed the elimination of Japanese interests in Manchuria, including the confiscation of the South Manchurian Railway. When the GMD convention was held in Nanjing from May 5, the mood there was such that Japan became the target of criticism. There was a huge outcry of, “Down with Japanese imperialism!” and angry demands for the recovery of Port Arthur, Dalian, and the Manchurian Railway, as well as withdrawal of Japanese troops guarding railway property. The Chinese did not return the goodwill of the still idealistic Shidehara in kind. Instead, they were relieved by Shidehara’s return and simply barreled ahead, placing their hopes in revolutionary diplomacy.

The Manchurian Incident was set in motion by the Liutiaogou Incident, which took place on September 19, 1931 at Liutiaogou, 8 kilometers north of Fengtian, when explosives were detonated on the tracks of the South Manchurian Railway. After the explosions, the 500-man Shimamoto Battalion attacked a 6,800-man Chinese brigade, routing it completely.

Today everyone in Japan knows that it was the Japanese who struck the match, who instigated the explosion on Manchurian property at Liutiaogou, in a Manchuria whose environment had already turned toxic. If the Japanese had not struck that match, the Chinese would assuredly have done the honors. That is how very explosive and volatile the situation in Manchuria had become. The explosion was merely the final, tiny cause, the last of a mountain of innumerable causes – the last straw, to borrow an English expression that means “a further difficulty that comes after a series of other difficulties, that makes a situation unbearable.” Therefore, the incident was more of an effect than a cause. In other words, the Manchurian Incident cannot be defined as the first stage of Japanese aggression in China. The author’s conclusion is that it was the inevitable result of Chinese policies that were, for a quarter of a century, hostile and insulting to Japan.

URL: 　 https://www.sdh-fact.com/book-article/2286/
PDF: https://www.sdh-fact.com/CL/Road35E.pdf

MOTEKI Hiromichi, Chairman
Society for the Dissemination of Historical Fact

『大東亜戦争への道』（展転社）
中村　粲
その３４　第九章　赤色支那への対応　第６節　不戦条約と自衛権

昭和３年（１９２８年）は、田中内閣が「不戦条約」という国際条約を締結して、列国と共に戦争放棄の意志を世界に表明した年でもあります。この不戦条約は戦後の東京裁判において日本断罪のために大いに利用された条約です。
ケロッグ米国務長官とブリアン仏外相の提唱でパリに於いて締結された「戦争放棄に関する条約」は、ケロッグ条約、パリ条約などともよばれます。条約は次の３条からなり、国際紛争解決の手段としての戦争を非とし、その放棄を宣言したものです。
第１条 締約国は国際紛争解決のために戦争に訴えることを非とし、且つその相互関係に於いて国家
の政策の手段としての戦争を放棄することをその各自の人民の名において厳粛に宣言す。
第２条 締約国は相互間に起こることあるべき一切の紛争又は紛議は、その性質又は起因の如何を問
ず平和的手段によるの外これが処理又は解決を求めざることを約す。
第３条（批准と加盟手続き）
しかし、この理想主義的な条約には重大な欠陥がありました。米英仏等列強の主張によって、自衛戦
争を除外したことです。しかも米の如き、それが正当であるか否かの裁定権は当事国にあると主張したのです。これでは、実質的には法として無効ということになります。
戦後の東京裁判におけるパル判決書によれば、自衛の問題関しケロッグ国務長官は次のように言明しています。
「自衛権は、関係国の主導下にある領土の防衛だけに限られてはいない。そして本条約の下に於いては、自衛権がどんな行為を含むか又いつ自衛権を発動するかについて各国自ら判断する特権を有する。」
田中外相は米国提案に同意を表する回答文を手交する際、自衛権に関し、「手近の問題として内乱闘争の絶えざる支那の如き隣国を持つ日本としては、固より戦争はその欲するところに非ざるも自衛の必要上適当の手段を取るべきことは常に予見し置かざるべからざる所」としてマクヴェー駐日米大使の了解を求め、更に支那に対する日本の立場につき説明しました。
この不戦条約は、早くも翌年破られました。不戦条約侵犯第１号はソ連でした。１９２９年、満州の張学良政権はハルピンのソ連領事館捜索で共産革命計画の証拠を押収したのを機会に、東支鉄道の実力回収に踏み切ったのに対し、ソ連は空陸両軍を以てソ満国境を超え、満州に侵入しました。張学良の東北軍は撃退され、ソ連は帝政ロシア以来の特権である東支鉄道再び奪還することに成功しました。米英仏伊の諸国は、不戦条約の義務につきソ連の注意を喚起しましたが、ソ連は満洲侵攻は「自衛行動」であると反論し、第３国の干渉を拒絶したのです。
満州事変において日本は、関東軍の行動は自衛のためであると主張し、日華直接交渉を主張しましたが、米国は日本の「不戦条約違反」を非難し、リットン報告書も、我国の自衛の主張を否認しました。しかし、その２年も前に、ソ連が不戦条約を破って自衛の名の下に満洲に侵攻した事実を想起するとき、満州事変を日本の侵略とする説は完全に説得力を失います。また、そのソ連が東京裁判で、満州事変以降の日本の政策を侵略と断罪したのですから、全くあきれ返ったものです。

・その３４，第９章６節： https://hassin.org/01/wp-content/uploads/Road34.pdf
・　〃　　第９章６節　英訳文：https://www.sdh-fact.com/CL/Road34E.pdf

令和７年１月１０日
「史実を世界に発信する会」 会長　茂木弘道
協力者代表：神奈川大学教授　小山和伸

THE ROAD TO THE GREATER EAST ASIAN WAR
Nakamura Akira, Dokkyo University Professor Emeritus
(English Translation: Society for the Dissemination of Historical Fact)
Part 34, Chapter 9: Contending with Attempts to Communize China-VI

In 1928 the Tanaka Cabinet joined the other powers in signing an international pact, the General Treaty for Renunciation of War as a National Policy, the intent of which was to demonstrate to the world the desire of signatories to abolish war.

The same treaty was used excessively in the condemnation of Japan at the IMTFE, held after the Greater East Asian War. Proposed by Frank B. Kellogg, US secretary of state, and Aristide Briand, the French foreign minister (and therefore commonly known as the Kellog-Briand Pact, but also referred to as the Pact of Paris), the treaty was concluded in Paris on August 27, 1928. It comprised the following three provisions:

Article I
The High Contracting Parties solemnly declare in the names of their respective people that they condemn recourse to war for the solution of international controversies, and renounce it, as an instrument of national policy in their relations with one another.

Article II
The High Contracting Parties agree that the settlement or solution of all disputes or conflicts of whatever nature or whatever origin they may be, which may arise among them shall never be sought except by pacific means.

(Article III describes ratification and procedural matters.）

However, the idealistic treaty had a major flaw: thanks to assertions on the part of powers like the UK, US, and France, it made exceptions for defensive wars. Furthermore, as the US argued, it allowed the nation or nations involved in the dispute to decide whether the claim of self-defense was legitimate. In his judgement submitted to the IMTFE, held after the Greater East Asian War had ended, Justice Radhabinod Pal refers to a statement made by Secretary Kellog concerning self-defense, in which the US argued that the right of self-defense was not limited to a nation’s own territory.

What was Japan’s reaction to the treaty? Foreign Minister Tanaka prepared a written response describing Japan’s position and stating that he agreed with the American proposal. When he delivered it to US Ambassador Charles MacVeagh, he sought the diplomat’s understanding by further elaborating on Japan’s attitude toward China. About the right of self-defense he said, “Japan’s neighbor, China, is constantly engaged in civil warfare. Although war with China is, of course, not something we wish to engage in, we must always be cognizant of the necessity of taking appropriate defense measures.”

The first violation of the pact soon occurred, the guilty party being the USSR. In 1929 Zhang Xueliang searched the Soviet consulate in Harbin., where he discovered and confiscated evidence of a communist revolutionary plot, which motivated him to seize control of Chinse Eastern Railway. The Soviets retaliated by crossing the border between the USSR and Manchuria with both air and land forces., and invading Manchuria in November. They repelled Zhang’s northeastern army and succeeded in restoring the railway to joint Soviet-Chinese administration, as it had been since the days of imperial Russia. The Sino-Soviet conflict drew the attention of the US, UK, France, and Italy concerning the USSR’s obligation to the Pact of Paris. But the Soviets objected to the interference of third-party nations, insisting that they had acted in self-defense.

When the Manchurian Incident arose, the Japanese advocated for negotiations to be held between Japan and China, arguing that action taken by the Guandong Army had been motivated by self-defense. However, the US castigated Japan over its “violation of the anti-war treaty.” Additionally, the Lytton Report, issued in 1932, rejected Japan’s assertion of self-defense. Nevertheless, when we recall that, two years prior to the Manchurian Incident, the USSR violated the Pact of Paris by invading Manchuria in the name of self-defense, the argument that the Manchurian Incident was an act of Japanese aggression loses all credibility. Moreover, when we consider the fact that at the IMTFE, the very same Soviet Union condemned Japan’s policies subsequent to the Manchurian Incident as acts of aggression, we are overcome by an absolutely unendurable despair.

URL: 　 https://www.sdh-fact.com/book-article/2270/
PDF: https://www.sdh-fact.com/CL/Road34E.pdf

MOTEKI Hiromichi, Chairman
Society for the Dissemination of Historical Fact