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『大東亜戦争への道』（展転社）
中村　粲
その３７　第十章　満州事変　第３節　事変後の経過概要

柳条溝事件の直後、中国は事件を国際連盟に提訴しました。日本は、事実に関する声明を発し、日本が満州で何ら領土的欲望のないこと、日本の希望は、日本人が正当な権利に基づいて平和裏に満洲で居住営業できることであると述べました。日本が満州で領土的欲望を有しないと言ったのは、日本は満州を軍事力で併合できたにもかかわらず、併合せず、独立国としたことを見れば理解できましょう。
連盟理事会は日本軍の速やかなる付属地内への撤退を決議したのに対して、幣原外相は、付属地に撤兵するには日支平常関係回復のための大綱を協定する必要があるとして、以下の５項目協定案をブリアン議長に通告したのですが、受け入れられませんでした。
１， 侵略的政策又は行動をせぬ旨の相互宣言。
２， 敵愾心扇動を抑えるため一切の手段を取る旨相互約束。
３， 日本は満州を含む支那の領土保全を尊重する意思を再確認する。
４， 支那は満州における日本人の居住旅行、平和的事業の保護を約束する。
５， 破壊的競争を防止し、満州における鉄道に関する日支間の現存条約を実施する協定を結ぶ。
こうしているうちにも満洲の独立機運は昂揚し、１１月中には東３省ことごとくが南京政府から独立したのでした。
翌年１月３日、張学良の政府所在地錦州を日本軍は無血占領し、錦州政権は崩壊しました。これに対してアメリカのスチムソン国務長官は支那の主権、独立、領土保全の原則や門戸開放政策に違反し、また米国民の権利を侵害する一切の合法性を承認しないという「スチムソン・ドクトリン」を日支双方に手交しました。
これに対して日本政府は、「満蒙における行政当局の変更（独立）は、全く該地方人民が必要止むを得ざる処置として自らこれを行ったに過ぎない、満蒙の支那官憲は大方逃亡又は辞職し、その結果政治機能の破壊をきたしたのである、支那国民のみが他の国民と異なり民族自決の機能を欠いているのだ」と反論したのでした。
独立した勢力は建国工作を進め、３月１日満州国政府は建国宣言を発し、宣統帝溥儀が執政に就任しました。
現地調査委員会としてリットン（英）を委員長とする、伊、仏、米、独の５人が選定され、調査報告書を提出しました。連盟総会はリットン報告書に基づき、満州の主権は支那に属すると梨、日本軍は付属地内への撤収を勧告しました。それによれば満洲は一種の国際管理下に置かれ、その秩序は憲兵によって維持することになっていました。勧告案は、賛成４２、反対１（日本）、棄権１（タイ）で採択されました。すでに満州国は成立し、発展しつつあったわけで、とうてい日本はこれを受け入れることはできません。連盟を脱退したのでした。脱退宣言をした松岡代表は日本の立場をよく主張したとして、帰国するとさながら凱旋将軍の如く歓呼の声で迎えられたのでした。

・その３７，第１０章３節　日本語原文： http://hassin.org/01/wp-content/uploads/Road37.pdf
・　〃　　第１０章３節　英訳文： https://www.sdh-fact.com/CL/Road37E.pdf

令和７年４月２５日
「史実を世界に発信する会」 会長　茂木弘道
協力者代表：神奈川大学教授　小山和伸

THE ROAD TO THE GREATER EAST ASIAN WAR
Nakamura Akira, Dokkyo University Professor Emeritus
(English Translation: Society for the Dissemination of Historical Fact)
Part 37, Chapter 10: The Manchurian Incident-3

Soon after the Liutiaogou Incident, China tendered a protest to the League of Nations. A few days later Japan issued its own declaration concerning the incident, which stated that Japan had no territorial ambitions whatsoever in Manchuria, and that Japan’s only desire was for Japanese citizens to be able to reside and do business in Manchuria, in peace, in accordance with their legitimate rights. The pronouncement about Japan’s having no territorial designs on Manchuria was sincere. Consider the fact that Japan could certainly have used its military might to annex Manchuria, had it wished to. However, it did not. Instead, it opted to establish an independent state.

On September 30, 1931 the Council of the League of Nations issued a resolution that called for negotiation between Japan and China concerning the following:

1. Mutual declaration of non-aggressive policy or action in Manchuria.
2. Mutual engagements to suppress hostile agitation.
3. Reaffirmation by Japan as to the territorial integrity of China, including Manchuria.
4. Japanese subjects in Manchuria to be sufficiently protected by Chinese when carrying on their peaceful and legitimate proceedings.
5. Arrangements to be reached between Japan and China for the prevention of ruinous railway competition and for the carrying into effect of existing railway agreements.

Meanwhile, the independence movement in Manchuria was gaining momentum. In November all three eastern provinces severed ties with the Nanjing government.

On January 3, 1932 the Japanese military achieved a bloodless occupation of Jinzhou, whereupon Zhang’s government vanished into thin air. US Secretary of State Henry Stimson’s reaction was to send a note addressed to both Japan and China, dated January 7. The note laid out the notorious Stimson Doctrine, stating that the US “cannot admit the legality of any situation de facto nor does it intend to recognize any treaty or agreement entered into between those governments, which may impair the treaty rights of the United States or its citizens in China, including those which relate to the sovereignty of China.”

In its response to Stimson, the Japanese government stated that “any replacement which has occurred in the personnel of the administration of Manchuria has been the necessary act of the local population.” It went on to say that during Manchurian Incident, the majority of the Chinese officials in Manchuria and Mongolia took flight or resigned, thud destroying the government’s political functions. “The Japanese Government cannot think that the Chinese people, unlike all others, are destitute of power of self-determination and organizing themselves in order to secure civilized conditions when deserted by existing officials.”

In Manzhouguo (the State of Manchuria) the nation-building process was steadily moving forward. On March 1 its government announced the launching of its administration, and on March 9, Puyi was installed as head of state (Emperor Xuantong).

In February of 1933 the Council of the League of the Nations recognized the sovereignty of China over Manchuria, on the basis of the Lytton Report, and issued a warning to Japan to withdraw its troops into the South Manchuria railway zone. The league recommended that Manchuria be administered by an international organization, and that order there kept by an international police force. When delegates were polled, there were 42 votes in favor of the report, one vote against, and one abstention. By that time Manzhouguo had been established and was flourishing. The Japanese fundamentally disagreed with the report’s recommendation, and it was at this point that they bid farewell to the League of Nation.

URL: 　 https://www.sdh-fact.com/book-article/2301/
PDF: 　 https://www.sdh-fact.com/CL/Road37E.pdf

MOTEKI Hiromichi, Chairman
Society for the Dissemination of Historical Fact

『大東亜戦争への道』（展転社）
中村　粲
その３６　第十章　満州事変　第２節　４半世紀の累積因

では、満州事変を生んだ４半世紀の累積因とはいかなるものあったのでしょうか。「４分の１世紀の間、満州における国際政戦は主として鉄道政戦なりき」とリットン報告書が述べている通り、鉄道問題は満州における日支間の最大の争点でした。
日露戦争の後、この荒蕪の地に鉄道を敷き、産業を興して繁栄の基を築き、治安を確立してたため、中国の戦乱を逃れんとする多くの漢民族が満州に流入し、その数は毎年百万と言われました。辛亥革命当時千８百万だった満州の人口は、満州事変のころには３千万に達していたのです。満洲の貿易は増加し、１９０７年の２０年後の１９２７年には貿易額は６．５５倍になっています。満洲の支配者張作霖は、鉄道の重要性と利益の大なることを知るにつれ、自己の手で鉄道を建設し、全満洲の経済的利益を収奪せんと企図するに至ったのです。
１９０５年「日清満洲に関する条約付属取極」で、「清国政府は南満州鉄道の利益を保護するの目的を以て該鉄道を未だ回収せざる以前に於いては該鉄道付近にこれと併行する幹線又は該鉄道の利益を害すべき枝線を敷設せざることを承認す」と約定したにも関わらず、２大併行線を１９２９年には敷設し、満鉄包囲網を完成させたのです。
また、１９１５年日華条約で確定された日本人の南満州での土地商租を侵害する行為に出たのです。条約締結の１カ月後に大総統令を以て「懲弁国賊条例」なる刑事特別法規を発布し、日本人に土地を商租した者は「売国罪」として死刑に処すことに決めたのです。一方で日本との条約で商租を公約しながら他方で締約当事者が無効ならしめるという近代国家として信じられないことを行ったのです。さらに、１９２９年には「懲治盗売国土暫行条例」を制定して外国人に対する土地の抵当租与を厳禁し、これに違反するものを死刑その他罰金刑に処することとし、この法令は過去に遡ってまで適用され、１９１５年日華条約は空文に帰し、日本人の南満州における商租権行使は全くできなくなったのです。
さらに反日教育が徹底され、日清戦争の下関条約の不当、琉球・台湾・朝鮮を中国領と主張、義和団事件議定書否認、関東州租借地の返還等々教育、大衆キャンペーンを展開するに至ったのです。
このような反日機運の結果として、中国兵の侮日行為、鉄道妨害、日支官憲衝突事件など満洲で、昭和２年から５年までの間以２４０件発生しています。その頂点が、中村大尉殺害事件でした。１９３１年６月９日、参謀本部の中村震太郎大尉は、予備騎兵曹長と共に白系露人１名、蒙古人１名を連れ兵要地調査に出かけたのですが、２６日に屯墾軍第３団長・関玉衝指揮下の中国兵にとらわれ、翌27日玉衝の手によって全員射殺され、死体は証拠隠滅のために焼き払われたのでした。関東軍は調査を開始し、事件の核心をつかむ情報を得ました。中国側は全面否認していましたので軍は威力調査を行おうとしましたが、中央部の入れるところとならず、外交交渉に移されました。しかし、中国側は回答を遷延すると同時に、王正廷外交部長などは、「中村事件は全く事実無根で、満州には好んで事を構える不良ごろつきの日本人が多いので、おそらくこの連中が捏造した宣伝である」と言明したので日本国民の怒りは爆発しました。しかし、隠しきれないことを悟った栄臻参謀長が事実を全面的に承認したのが9月１８日のことでした。この日の夜、柳条湖事件は起こったのでした。

・その３２，第１０章２節　日本語原文：http://hassin.org/01/wp-content/uploads/Road36.pdf
・　〃　　第１０章２節　英訳文： https://www.sdh-fact.com/CL/Road36E.pdf

令和７年４月４日
「史実を世界に発信する会」 会長　茂木弘道
協力者代表：神奈川大学教授　小山和伸

THE ROAD TO THE GREATER EAST ASIAN WAR
Nakamura Akira, Dokkyo University Professor Emeritus
(English Translation: Society for the Dissemination of Historical Fact)
Part 36, Chapter 10: The Manchurian Incident-2

What were the cumulative factors that, over a quarter-century, gave rise to the Manchurian Incident?
According to the Lytton Commission’s report, “the international politics of Manchuria for a quarter of a century have been largely railway politics.”

After the Russo-Japanese War, the Japanese constructed a railroad in the wasteland that was Manchuria, established industries, built an underpinning for prosperity, and maintained public order. Then, each year, a million Han Chinese, desperate to escape the ravages of war in China, poured into Manchuria. The population of Manchuria, 18 million at the time of the 1911 Revolution, had increased to 30 million by 1931. Thanks to Japanese economic development efforts, Manchurian trade increased. In 1927, 20 years after the customs authority in Dalian opened, there was evidence of remarkable growth: the trade volume for China proper was 2.64 times, and that for Manchuria, 6.55 times the 1907 figure. Zhang Zuolin, then holding sway over Manchuria, realized how important and how profitable the railroads were and decided to exploit Manchurian economic benefits by constructing his own railroad.

The Treaty of Manchuria (December 1905), provided that the Chinese Government agree, “for the purpose of protecting the interests of the South Manchuria Railway, not to construct, prior to the recovery by them of the said railway, any main line in the neighborhood of and parallel to the railway, or any branch line which might be prejudicial to the interest of the above-mentioned railway.” However, Zhang violated the treaty by completing parallel lines in 1929.

Japanese land-lease and commercial rights in southern Manchuria were established by the Sino-Japanese Treaty of 1915. However, on June 24, 1915, just one month after the signing of that treaty, the Chinese issued a presidential decree promulgating a special criminal law called the Ordinance for Punishment of Traitors, which stated that anyone who leased land to a Japanese would be executed for treason. Such behavior does not even remotely resemble that of a modern, civilized nation. In July 1929 the Fengtian provincial government enacted the Provincial Ordinance Prohibiting the Theft and Sale of Land. It proceeded to convey secret orders to local officials within its jurisdiction, to execute or impose heavy fines on anyone who mortgaged or leased land to foreign nationals. The law was applied retroactively. The 1915 Sino-Japanese Treaty had been reduced to empty words it was now completely impossible for Japanese to exercise their commercial leasing rights in Southern Manchuria.

By requiring the inclusion of anti-Japanese education programs in schools and anti-Japanese propaganda in the military, as well as the singing of both civilian and military anti-Japanese songs, the GMD planted staunch anti-Japanese sentiment in the minds of the Chinese people.

As the anti-Japanese movement gained momentum, incident after incident arose. Typical were anti-Japanese acts committed by Chinese troops, interference with railway operation, and clashes between Japanese and Chinese officials prior to the Manchurian incident. According to a survey conducted by the Guandong Army’s Operation Section, the number of incidents from January 1927 to December 1930 was 240. Additionally, over 300 similar problems, including attacks on and persecution of Korean residents in Manchuria, were still unresolved when the Manchurian Incident broke out.

Not long before the Manchurian incident, Army Capt. Nakamura Shintarō, a member of the Operation Section, was killed by Chinese troops. The Lytton Report states that “the Nakamura case, more than any other single incident, greatly aggravated the resentment of the Japanese and their agitation in favour of forceful means to effect a solution of outstanding Sino-Japanese difficulties in regard to Manchuria.”

URL: https://www.sdh-fact.com/book-article/2295/
PDF: https://www.sdh-fact.com/CL/Road36E.pdf

MOTEKI Hiromichi, Chairman
Society for the Dissemination of Historical Fact

『大東亜戦争への道』（展転社）
中村　粲

その３５　第十章　満州事変　第１節　満州緊迫、柳条溝事件へ

幣原外交も田中外交も在支・在満権益の擁護という点では同じでしたが、田中はこれらの権益を擁護するために、支那満洲の治安維持に迄関心を有するに至ったという点で、幣原外交の不干渉主義とは趣を異にしたのでした。しかし、田中の積極政策もあるいは幣原が張学良に対して示した融和政策も、中国の排日政策と反日機運を鎮めるに由無く、事態は満州事変という破局に向かって進むより他なかったのでした。

張学良の易幟の後、赤化された国民党の勢力は公然と東三省に波及し、満州の排日は激成されました。排日と赤化―これが満州事変の基底因になっています。済南事件の最中に南京国民政府の外交部長王正廷はいわゆる「革命外交」を唱道しました。中国側の一方的な通告で、一切の不平等条約を廃棄できるという主張です。昭和３年（１９２８年）７月７日、国民政府は日本に対して明治２９年締結の日清通商航海条約の無効を通告してしてきたのです。この条約は１０年目ごとに改正交渉ができるようになっていますが、中国側の主張は、改正交渉が行われた場合は、交渉が成立しなくても現行法は失効するというもので、このような一方的な執行宣告はとても受け入れられるものではなく、朝野こぞって強硬に反対のでした。昭和４年幣原が外相に復帰し、日支関税協定で中国の関税自主権を承認しました。

しかし、こうしているさなか満洲の深部は赤化され、国民党中央政府の支配の及ばない間島地方の排日暴動となって重大化して行ったのです。満洲の朝鮮人共産主義者は自ら解体して中共に合流し、中共満洲委員会に加盟しました。このような背景の下、昭和５年５月３０日、間島各地で暴動が発生、発電所、通信・交通機関破壊、領事館、親日朝鮮人家屋が襲撃され、間島在住の日本人、朝鮮人に多大の恐怖を巻き起こしました。現地日本人居留民は大会を開き、外務省と出先官憲の軟弱を非難し、警察力増強を要求する陳情書を首相・外相らに送りました。この後、日本人警察官が中国軍隊から一斉射撃を受け、２名即死、１名重傷という事件が起こりましたが、ところが幣原は、日本人警官増強はかえって日支対立を深める恐れがあるとの判断から、応援警察の引き上げを行ったのでした。結果、昭和５年後半には間島の共産主義者によるテロ事件（共匪事件）は、８１件、死者４４、負傷者、焼失家屋無数という結果となったのです。

昭和６年になると「革命外交」路線は一層強められ、特に満州の排日は中央政府の統制が全く不可能なまでに激化して行きました。奉天では遼寧国民外交協会主催の排日会議が開かれ、満洲各地の代表者３００名余りが集まり、満鉄回収を含む日本の在満権益の一掃の問題が討議されました。５月５日から南京で開催された国民会議では、ひたすら日本が非難の対象とされ、「打倒日本帝国主義」が叫ばれ、旅代回収、満鉄回収、鉄道守備兵撤退が怒号されました。理想主義的な外交原則を引っ提げて再び登場した幣原外交でしたが、中国は決して幣原の「善意」に応えようとはしなかったのであり、むしろ「幣原外交の時代となり、支那側は内心安堵し、更に進んで着々革命外交の実施を期待するの至った」（奉天総領事林久治郎著『満州事変と奉天総領事』）。

このような状況を打開すべく引き起こされたのが、昭和６年９月１８日、柳条溝における満鉄爆破に始まる満州事変です。爆破のあと、５００の島本大隊は王位鉄指揮下の独立第７旅団６８００を攻撃して北大営を占拠、翌朝までに奉天市を完全に掌握しました。

危険なガスの充満する満州で、現実に柳条溝の鉄道爆破事件というマッチを擦ったのが日本側であったことは間違いありません。しかし、日本側が点火しなければ必ず中国側によって点火されるほどに満洲の緊迫状況は持ちこたえ得る限界に近づいていたのでした。柳条溝事件は無数の原因の累積の上に加えられた最後の証言員―英語で言う the last straw の如きものでした。ですから、満州事変は原因であるというよりも多くの結果というべきものです。満州事変は日本の中国侵略の出発点ではなく、４半世紀にわたる中国の排日・侮日政策の必然の結果であったというのが作者の結論です。

・その３２，第９章６節： http://hassin.org/01/wp-content/uploads/Road35.pdf
・　〃　　第９章６節　英訳文： https://www.sdh-fact.com/CL/Road35E.pdf

令和７年２月２５日

「史実を世界に発信する会」 会長　茂木弘道
協力者代表：神奈川大学教授　小山和伸

THE ROAD TO THE GREATER EAST ASIAN WAR
Nakamura Akira, Dokkyo University Professor Emeritus
(English Translation: Society for the Dissemination of Historical Fact)
Part 35, Chapter 10: The Manchurian Incident-I

February 25, 2025

The ultimate objectives of Shidehara diplomacy and Tanaka diplomacy were to maintain and develop Japan’s vested interests. The difference between the two lay in the means by which they were to be implemented. Neither Tanaka’s positive policy nor Shidehara’s friendship policy was able to quell Chinese anti-Japanese activities or fully protect Japanese interests in China. With no effective solution in sight, the Japan-China relationship lurched toward the catastrophe that was the Manchurian Incident.

Subsequent to the Northeast Flag Replacement, the influence of the communizing GMD spread to the three eastern provinces, and the anti-Japanese sentiment there intensified steadily. Communization and the anti-Japanese campaign were, without doubt, the underlying causes of the Manchurian Incident. Wang Zhengting, who was installed as the Nanjing government’s ministry of foreign affairs in the throes of the Jinan Incident, cleverly used the democratic movement to promote anti-Japanese policies. The policy that proved most shocking to the Japanese was his “revolutionary diplomacy.”

It was an exceedingly selfish diplomatic ploy by which the Chinese announced, without engaging in any negotiations, that all unequal treaties would be abrogated. On July 7, 1928, the Nationalist government initiated another aspect of revolutionary diplomacy, advising Japan that the Sino-Japanese Treaty of Commerce and Navigation concluded in 1896 was now null and void.

According to the provisions of that treaty, negotiations on its revision could be held every 10 years. However, this time the Chinese stated that the treaty would become invalid should such negotiations take place and fail. With full support from ruling and opposition parties, Japan vehemently protested this unilateral declaration for making light of international practices and principles of good faith. Shidehara, as foreign minister of the Hamaguchi government, recognized Chinese tariff autonomy on May 6, 1930.

However, deep in Manchuria communism was rapidly gaining ground, and violent anti-Japanese incidents were breaking out in the Jiandao region, where the Chinese government had no control. The Korean Communist Party of Manchuria opted to disband and merge with the CCP’s Manchurian Committee. During an uprising that occurred on May 30 in Jiandao, electric power plants, and communications and tariff facilities were destroyed. The Japanese Consulate and the homes of pro-Japanese Koreans were attacked, and Japanese and Koreans living in the area were thrown into panic. Immediately after the incident ended, Japanese residents held a meeting at which they criticized the spineless Foreign Ministry and local authorities. They drafted a petition demanding an increased police presence, which they sent to the prime minister, foreign minister, governor-general of Korea, and Japanese political parties and newspapers. Not long thereafter, Chinese troops fired a volley of shots at Japanese police officers on patrol. Two officers were killed instantly, and another was seriously injured. The Japanese decided to dispatch reinforcements in the form of 103 police officers. However, Shidehara judged that increasing the number of Japanese police would intensify strife between Japan and China, and even threaten Japanese interests in Manchuria. Therefore, over the objection of Saito Makoto, governor general of Korea, he ordered the reinforcements to withdraw, but that decision was met by vociferous protests against Shidehara from Japanese residents of Jiandao. In the latter half of 1930 the number of terrorist incidents in the Jiandao region was estimated at 81, resulting in 44 deaths, and countless injured, not to mention numerous homes destroyed by fire.

By 1931 anti-Japanese sentiment in Manchuria had escalated to the point where the central government could not begin to control them. In April the Liaoning Nationalist Foreign Affairs Association sponsored an anti-Japanese conference in Fengtian, which was attended by 300 representatives from all over Manchuria who discussed the elimination of Japanese interests in Manchuria, including the confiscation of the South Manchurian Railway. When the GMD convention was held in Nanjing from May 5, the mood there was such that Japan became the target of criticism. There was a huge outcry of, “Down with Japanese imperialism!” and angry demands for the recovery of Port Arthur, Dalian, and the Manchurian Railway, as well as withdrawal of Japanese troops guarding railway property. The Chinese did not return the goodwill of the still idealistic Shidehara in kind. Instead, they were relieved by Shidehara’s return and simply barreled ahead, placing their hopes in revolutionary diplomacy.

The Manchurian Incident was set in motion by the Liutiaogou Incident, which took place on September 19, 1931 at Liutiaogou, 8 kilometers north of Fengtian, when explosives were detonated on the tracks of the South Manchurian Railway. After the explosions, the 500-man Shimamoto Battalion attacked a 6,800-man Chinese brigade, routing it completely.

Today everyone in Japan knows that it was the Japanese who struck the match, who instigated the explosion on Manchurian property at Liutiaogou, in a Manchuria whose environment had already turned toxic. If the Japanese had not struck that match, the Chinese would assuredly have done the honors. That is how very explosive and volatile the situation in Manchuria had become. The explosion was merely the final, tiny cause, the last of a mountain of innumerable causes – the last straw, to borrow an English expression that means “a further difficulty that comes after a series of other difficulties, that makes a situation unbearable.” Therefore, the incident was more of an effect than a cause. In other words, the Manchurian Incident cannot be defined as the first stage of Japanese aggression in China. The author’s conclusion is that it was the inevitable result of Chinese policies that were, for a quarter of a century, hostile and insulting to Japan.

URL: 　 https://www.sdh-fact.com/book-article/2286/
PDF: https://www.sdh-fact.com/CL/Road35E.pdf

MOTEKI Hiromichi, Chairman
Society for the Dissemination of Historical Fact